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In a judgment delivered less than a week before his retirement, Lord Denning
spoke of the current demand for "open government" - adding that it is something
which "is voiced mainly by newsmen and critics and oppositions." I The tone of
his remarks is at first sight surprising: for he, more than anyone else, had given
judicial support for greater openness in government at alllcvc\s. This support had
been evident in his ex officio work as chairman of the Advisory Council on Public
Records, in several aspects of administrative law, in his response to purported
extensions of criminal contempt of court, and most notably in his contribution to
the developing law of "Crown privilege" or public interest immunity.
Lord Denning's pronouncements in such areas do not, to employ the words of
one academic commentator, provide "a body of doctrine reflecting a coherent and
consistent philosophy." 2 But it is difficult for any judge to develop a coherent and
consistent philosophy in the volatile field of constitutional and administrative law.
The institutions vary, the statutory contexts differ, and it is misleading in most
circumstances to rely upon a straightforward regard for precedent. There are
well-established assumptions or presumptions or general concepts, of course, but
a critical component of a judge's approach on public law must be the instinctive
reaction to events. James Bradley Thayer, writing about Dicey, once spoke of the
"strange contrivances" of the English Constitution as "a marvellous outcome of
instinct, of a singular sense and apprehension, feeling its sure way over
centuries";3 and Dicey himself, writing about federalism, described federal
notions as "absolutely foreign to the historical and, so to speak, instinctive policy of
English constitutionalists." 4
"Rouse Ball Professor of English Law and President of Wolfson College, University of Cambridge.
I. Air Canada v. Secrelary of Slale for Trade (No.2) [1983] 1 All E.R. 161, 172.
2. J. A. G. Griffith, in an article ("A Judge who was always his own man") written after the
announcement of Lord Denning's impending resignation in 1982: The Observer, 30 May 1982, at p. 8.
On Lord Denning's resignation, see also Hugo Young ("Why Denning is Irreplaceable') in the SlInd(JY
Times, 30 May 1982, at p. 15 and a leading article ("End of the Denning Era") in The Times, 30 July
1982, at p. II. A formal farewell ceremony in the Court of Appeal is reported in The Times, 31 July
1982, at p. 2.
3. James Bradley Thayer, "Dicey's Law of the English Constitution" (originally published 1885),
reproduced in Thayer, Legal Essays (1908), pp. 191-206 at p. 191.
4. A. V. Dicey, bllrodllclion 10 Ihe SllId), oj Ihe COlISlillllion, 8th ed. (1915), at xc.
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Lord Denning readily applied the historical and instinctive policy of English
constitutionalists, working out the Constitution "on purely practical grounds based
on our own experience and on our own needs." 5 Historical references abound in
his judgments, with comments about distinguished lawyers of the past,6 about real
or fictional cases of the past,? about famous sites or events,S and about his own
experience.9 He was fascinated by historical by-roads, as in his account of the
"delightful little treaty" of -1794 with the Micmacs of New Brunswick - a treaty in
which the King of England promised an Indian king and his brother that he would
provide for them and for the future generation "so long as the sun rises and river
flows." 10
From his sense of the continuity of constitutional guidelines in English history,
Lord Denning developed an instinctive appreciation of the balancing process
inheren~ in matters of constitutional and administrative law. His historical
references, obvious as many of them might seem, were utilised to reinforce both
his constitutional assumptions of individual freedom and his view of the
competing, changing demands of government and society. His constitutional
assumptions favoured ordinary people - ranging from "men who work at the
smithy shoeing horses, at the mill grinding corn, or at the saw mills cutting up
wood" II to "self-employed and small shopkeepers, good men and true who pay
5. Lord Justice Denning, "The Independence of the Judges" (Presidential Address of the Holdsworth
Club of the Faculty of Law, University of Birmingham, delivered on 16June 1950), reproduced in The
Lawyer and Juslice (ed. Brian W. Harvey) (1978), pp. 55, 56. See Geoffrey Marshall, Conslilulional
Theory (J 97 I), at pp. 86-90 (relating to Lord Denning's Romanes Lecture of 1959, From Precedmllo
Precedml).
6. Sir Edward Coke is often referred to (see, e.g., Cimlamondv. BrilishAirportsAulhority [1980] 2 All
E.R. 368, 370 linking the six carpenters to six car-hire drivers) and so are less well-known figures such
as Macmorron K.C. (referred to as"the acknowledged expert of his time on local government law") in
R. v. Clerk 10 Lancashire Police Commillee, ex p. Hook [1980] 2 All E.R. 353, 359.
7. The general warrant cases are given considerable prominence, not only in Chic Fashions (West
Wales) Ltd. v.Jones [1968] I All E.R. 229, 233 and Ghani v.Jones [1969] 3 All E.R. 1700,1703 but also
in R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. Rossminsler Ltd. [1979] 3 All E.R. 385, 398 (where Lord
Denning compared the "military style operation" there to "that Saturday, 30th April 1763, when the
Secretary of State issued a general warrant by which he authorised the King's messengers to arrest
John Wilkes and seize all his books and papers"). A fictional case injected into a comment about legal
delays wasJarndycev.Jarndyce from Bleak House (see BUlles Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer (No.3) [1980] 3
All E.R. 475, 480).
8. See, for instance, Lord Denning's remarks about the Pilgrim's Way (HaYMn v. Ke,u County Council
[1978] 2 All E.R. 97, 99-100), about George Stephenson's engine l(111m v. Gul/Oil Refining Lid. [1979]
3 All E.R. 1008,1012) and about the Peterloo Massacre (Hubbardv. Pill [1975] 3 All E.R. 1, 10).
9. In CitmamO/ld v. Brilish Airporls AUlhority [1980] 2 All E.R. 368, 373 Lord Denning recalled the
days when he drafted byelaws for the Southern Railway Company; in R. v. Greater London COUllcil,ex p.
Blackbum [1976] 3 All E.R. 184, 186 he referred to the Obscene Publications Act 1959: "I remember it
well. I attended the debates, and took part."
1O. R. v. Secrelary of Stale Jor Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, exp. Indian AssociatiO/IofA Iberia [1982] 2
All E.R. 118, 124.
II. Fawcell Properlies Ltd. v. Buckingham COllll1yCouncil [1960] 3 W.L.R. 831, 852-853 (H.L.).
12. R. v. bdand Revenue CommissiO/lers, ex p. N.F.S.S.B. [1980] 2 All E.R. 378, 388.
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their taxes" 13 - in their bewilderment with big organisations, governmental or
otherwise; they favoured local self-government (which he saw as "an important
part of our constitution" 13); they favoured freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, personal freedom, freedom of property, and contemporary ideas about
privacy and the right to work.14 These and other assumptions are explicit or
implicit in countless judgments delivered by Lord Denning from 1944 to 1982;
but they were not applied in a vacuum and Lord Denning has recognised, as all
judges in constitutional matters (not least those in the Supreme Court of the
United StateslS) have to recognise, that some assumptions may have to be
displaced from time to time.
In the area of public order, for instance, Lord Denning has eloquently spoken of
"the right to meet together, to go in procession, to demonstrate and to protest on
matters of public concern" as something which must be done "peaceably and in
good order without threats or incitement to violence or obstruction to traffic." 16
The integrity of a man's home, based on Chatham's claim that the "poorest man
may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown", is asserted: but
exceptions are allowed in the public interest.17 Open justice has to be measured
against respect for privacy and confidentiality;18freedom of expression should not
become a licence to publish pornography; 19freedom of association (especially the
freedom to form trade unions) must be assessed against other values in society;2o
and personal freedom must give way to a police officer's reasonable powers of
restraint.21 The manner in which the balance was tilted was frequently
controversial, so much so that one writer has described Lord Denning's
championship of 'freedom' as "positively perverse",22 and few would wish to
13. Norwich City Council v. Secretary of State for the Environmmt [1982] 1 All E.R. 737, 745. See also,
Webb v.Minister of Housing and Local Governmmt [1965] 2 All E.R. 193, 203.
14. See generally, Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom tmder the Law (Hamlyn Lectures, 1949); Sir Alfred
Denning, The Road /0 Justice (1955); Lord Denning, The Due Process of Law (1980); Lord Denning,
What Next in the Law? (1982).
15. See Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (the Chichele Lectures,
1975) (1976).
16. Hubbard v.Pitt [1975] 3 All E.R. 1, 10. See also,Kent v.Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Times L.R.
for 14May 1981 (The Times, 15May 1981, at p. 12) and R. v. Chief Constable of the Devon alld Cornwall
Constabulary, ex p. G.E.G.B. [1981J 3 All E.R. 826, 832.
17. Chic FashiollS (West Wales) Ltd. v.Jones [1968] 1All E.R. 229, 233. See also, Ghani v.Jones [1969] 3
All E.R. 1700, 1705, where Lord Denning spoke of "the inIerest of society at large in finding out
wrongdoers and repressing crime."
18. Home Office v. Hannan [1981J2 All E.R. 349, 363-364.
19. R. v.Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn (No.3) [1973] 1 All E.R. 324, 327-328; R. v.
Greater Loniion Council, ex p. Blackburn [1976J 3 All E.R. 184, 188; R. v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn, The Times, Times L.R. for 6 March 1980 (The Times, 7 March 1980, at p.
10). In the House of Lords in 1959 (H.L., Vol. 216, c. 503, 2June 1959) Lord Denning stated: "To
write literature is the proper use of freedom: to indulge in pornography is the abuse of it."
20. For a statement of Lord Denning's views on trade union legislation, see Bn'tish Broadcasting
Corporation v. Hearn [1978] 1 All E.R. 111, 115-116.
21. Dal/ison v. Caffery [1965] 1 QB. 348, 367.
22. Patricia Hewitt, The Abuse of Power (Civil Liberties in the United Kingdom) (1982), at p. 243. See also,
J. A. G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 3rd ed. (1985).
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defend the former Master of the Rolls on all his rulings. Indeed Lord Denning
himself has confessed to second thoughts.23
One of the most troublesome balancing exercises occurs where issues of
national security are at stake. The difficulties - and, indeed, the temptation to tilt
the balance in favour of the interests of the state24 - have been explored at length,
both in special inquiries and in the courts of law; and the legal complexities were
explored by M. L. Friedland in a study prepared for the McDonald Commission
in Canada a few years ago.zs Judicial decisions since Lord Denning's retirement
are a reminder of the difficulties.26 During his judicial career, Lord Denning,
adopting what he took to be Parliament's intention, gave considerable weight to
arguments of national security in matters of deportation;27 and a background of
security doubtless made him unsympathetic in litigation over journalists' sources
of information relating to the Vassall Inquiry.28 The Vassall Inquiry was to be
followed, incidentally, by Lord Denning's investigation of the circumstances
leading to the resignation of the Secretary of State for War. This investigation, the
Report of which appeared in September 1963,29 involved Lord Denning in effect
acting "as detective, solicitor, counsel and judge"; and, given its "serious defects
in procedure", the public acceptance of the Report may - according to the Salmon
Commission - "be regarded as a brilliant exception to what would normally occur
when an inquiry is carried out under such conditions." 30 It might be added that
hitherto few inquiries into matters of national security in this country have
conformed with normal standards of procedure or publicity; and Lord Denning's
extra-judicial venture was no exception.
23. See Lord Denning, What Next in the Law? (1982), at pp. 246-252, with reference to British Steel
Corporation v. Granada [1981] I All E.R. 417.
24. Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security, Cmd. 9715 of 1956,
para. 16.
25. See M. L. Friedland, National Security: The Legal Dimensions (1979). See also, J. Ll. J. Edwards,
Ministerial Responsibility for National Secrm'ty (1980) and C. E. S. Franks, Parlial1le1ltand Security Matle"
(1979). The 3-volume Report of the McDona]d Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police appeared in 1981. See, more recently, the Report of the Special
Comminee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Delicate Balance: A Security
Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society) (Onawa, November 1983).
26. See Secretary of State for Defence v. Guardian Newspapm Ltd. [1984] ] All E.R. 453, (C.A.) (and the
comments on national security at 458, 460 and 462); R. v. Secretary of State jor the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, exp. the CO/meilof Civil Service Unions, Times L.R. for 6 August 1984 (The Times, 7
August 1984, at p. 15).
27. See R. v. BrixtOl/ Prison (GovenlOr), expo Sob/ell [196213 All E.R. 641, 659 and R. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Departmellt, ex p. Hosellball [1977] 3 All f.R. 452, 457.
28. Attonu;y-General v. Mulholland and Foster [1963] 1 All E.R. 767. See generally, C. J. Miller,
Contempt of Court (1976), at pp. 58-61. The Vassall Inquiry was conducted by a Tribunal of Inquiry
(under Viscount Radcliffe): its Report was published in April 1963 (Cmnd. 2009).
29. Lord Denning's Report, Cmnd. 2152 of 1963. Lord Denning referred to the investigation in R. v.
Clerk to LlI1/cashirePolice Committee, ex p. Hook [1980] 2 All E.R. 353, 356 and in Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell
Petroleum Ltd. Times L.R. for 12 March 1980 (The Times, 13 March 1980, at p. 18).
30. Report of the Royal Commission into Tribunals of Inquiry, Cmnd. 312] of 1966, para. 21. See
also, Sir Cyril Salmon, Tribltllals of IIlqui,)' (Lionel Cohen Lectures at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, 14th Series, 1967), at pp. 13-15.
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From 1962, when he became Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning became
involved with the wider sphere of openness in government. His chairmanship of
the Advisory Council on Public Records brought him into regular contact with the
operation of what was then the fifty-year (and was soon to become the thirty-year)
rule.31 The Wilson Committee on Modern Public Records commented in 1981 on
the initiative taken by the Advisory Council (under Lord Denning) in seeking a
shortening of the basic closed period, and it was pointed out that the Council's
views "have also carried weight in urging that 75 years should be the normal
maximum closure for personally sensitive papers." 32 Perhaps his contact with the
issues of closed files influenced Lord Denning's judicial approach in a case
concerned with a local councillor's right of access to certain papers.33
Lord Denning's judicial approach towards all matters of secrecy was dictated by
his own firm belief in freedom of the Press, by his rejection of excessive assertions
of power by governmental and other bodies, and by his determination to avoid
technicalities and seek solutions on a case-by-case basis. Where his attitude
differed it was either in deference to Parliamentary wishes (for Lord Denning,
despite arguments about his style of statutory interpretation,34 regarded
Parliamentary sovereignty as "fundamental in our constitution" 35) or in response
to conduct of which he disapproved. Varying expressions of disapproval can be
found over the securing or handling of confidential documents in particular
circumstances.36 But it would be unfortunate if an assessment of Lord Denning's
contribution to open government were to be significantly affected by a handful of
31. See Report of the (Grigg) Committee on Departmental Records, Cmnd. 9163 of 1954, paras.
125-128 (on the responsibility of the Master of the Rolls for public records); Annual Reports of the
Advisory Council on Public Records (a body established by the Public Records Act 1958); Report of
the (Wilson) Committee on Modern Public Records (Selection and Access), Cmnd. 8204 of 1981,
paras. 292-328; and the Government's Response to the Wilson Report, Modern Public Records,
Cmnd. 8531 of 1982, paras. 46-48. In an Appendix to the 24th Report of the Annual Council (HCIO,
29 June 1983), a letter from Lord Denning and his colleagues (to the Lord Chancellor) comments on
the Wilson Report and the Government Response.
32. Cmnd. 8204, para. 303. See generally, Colin Holmes, "Government Files and Privileged Access",
Social His/ory vi. (1981), pp. 333-350 and Margaret Gowing, "Modern Public Records: Selection and
Access. The Report of 'The Wilson Committee"', Social His/or)' V. (1981), pp. 351-357. The
well-documented article by Colin Holmes is, in his own words, a "brief excursion into the complex,
chaotic and variable world of government files and the obscure and shadowy world of privileged
access." See also, D. G. 1'. Williams, "Official Secrecy in England", (1968) 3 Federal L.R. 20, pp.
47-50.
33. R. v. Clerk /0 Larlcashire PoliceAu/llOri(y, ex p. Hook [1980J 2 All E.R. 353 (dissenting judgment). See
the later case of R. v. Bimlingham Ciry Dis/rict Council, ex p. 0, Times L.R. for 23 February 1982 (The
Times, 23 February 1982, at p. 23).
34. See Dupor/ S/eels LId. v. Sirs [198011 All E.R. 529 (CA. and I-LL.) and, generally, Lord Denning,
The Disciplille of Law (1979), Ch. 2.
35. Smi/n v. Inner LorldOlIEducatioll Authority [197811 All E.R. 411, 415.
36. Bri/ish Steel Corpora/iorl v. Granada Television Ltd. [1981] I All E.R. 417, 441-442; /-lome Office v.
Harman [1981] 2 All E.R. 349, 363-364; and Air Canada v. Secre/aI)' of Slate for Trade (No.2) [198311
All E.R. 151, 180-181. For a hint of disapproval of cheque-book journalism, see Allowa)' v. Phillips
([nspec/orofTaxes) [1980] 3 All E.R. 138, 143.
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decisions where, rightly or wrongly, he allowed his judgments to be coloured by
such sentiments.
His belief in a free press has often been recorded, and in the Granada case Lord
Denning asserted that investigative journalism "has proved itself as a valuable
adjunct of the freedom of the press. Notably in the Watergate exposure in the
United States and the Poulson exposure in this country.,,37 Lord Denning's
vigorous approach to contempt of court is a classic reminder of his anxiety that
investigations by the press should not be artificially hindered. An attempt to
revitalise the law on scandalizing the court was brushed aside;38 he led the Court
of Appeal in an unsuccessful attempt to discharge the injunction in the
thalidomide case;39 the House of Lords ultimately endorsed his instinctive
reluctance tQ extend the sanctions of contempt of court to the area of
administrative tribunals;40 and the new time-limits in the Contempt of Court Act
1981 help substantially to avoid the evils of "gagging writs" to which Lord
Denning drew attention on more than one occasion.4\
Lord Denning's rejection of abuse of power is central to his influential role in
the development of what he termed a "well-organised and comprehensive" system
of adminstrative law.42 His judicial contributions can be seen in such areas as error
of law on the face of the record, jurisdictional error, and natural justice. In the
application of the principles of natural justice to the operation of big public local
inquiries, Lord Denning's views (again doubtless influenced by the background of
access to information) were to be rejected by a majority of the House of Lords; but
he articulated the views of many people in his assertion that there had "been a
deplorable loss of confidence in these inquiries ... We must use our authority to
see that inquiries are conducted fairly, in accordance with the requirements of
natural justice."43 In the control of discretionary power, however, Lord Denning
achieved some notable successes in the courts during the 1970s;44 though, as we
shall see, his refusal to concede unfettered discretion even to ministers of the
Crown had already been demonstrated in his approach to governmental secrecy.
37. [1981] 1 All E.R. 417, 441. See the attitudes to investigative journalism adopted by Lord
Wilberforce in the House of Lords in the Grallatta case ([1981] 1 All E.R. 417, 455) and by the Court
of Appeal in Blackshaw v. Lord [1983] 2 All E.R. 311, 325, 336, 339.
38. R. v. Metropolitan Police CommissiOller, ex p. Blackburn (No.2) [1968] 2 QB. ISO.
39. Altornry-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1973] I All E.R. 815. See now the Contempt of Court
Act 1981, s. 5 ("discussion of public affairs"). See, on the thalidomide decision in the Court of Appeal,
a leading article ("In the Public Interest") in The Times, 17 February 1973, at p. IS: this stated that it "is
good that the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that there may be occasions when the right to public
comment is of supreme value." See generally, Harold Evans, Good Times, Bad Times (1984), Ch. 4.
40. Allornry-General v. British Broadcasting Corporatioll [1979] 3 All E.R. 45.
41. Wallersteiner v. Moir [1974] 3 All E.R. 217, 230.
42. O'Reilly v. Mackman [1982] 3 All E.R. 680,691.
43. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is discussed in Peter Levin, "Public Inquiries: the Need for
Natural Justice", New Society, Vol. 50 (IS November 1979), at pp. 371-372. The decision of the House
of Lords is reported as Bushell v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] A.C. 75.
44. See generally, Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (1979), Part Two ("Misuse of Ministerial
Powers"); H. W. R. Wade, Constill/tiOllal Fll1ldamentals (Hamlyn Lectures, 1980), Ch. 4.
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A rejection of technicalities - save, perhaps, when technicalities can be used to
bolster individual rights or freedoms45 - is frequently found in Lord Denning's
judgments.46 This approach is found from the outset in his attitude towards
administrative law,47 and he recognised earlier than most "that adminstrative law
is in a phase of active development and that the judges will adapt the rules ... to
protect the rule of law." 48 Lord Denning's application of rules of locus standi4<J
and, more broadly, of natural justice50 depends very much on a case-by-case
technique through which he is able to adapt the rules to protect the rule oflaw. A
similar technique was reflected in his long struggle to overturn the rigid principles
which governed the law of Crown privilege until about twenty years ago.
It is now taken for granted that the government does not have an unfettered
control over the disclosure of documents in a court of law.51 The break from the
decision of the House of Lords in Duncan v. Cammell Laird fS Co., Ltd,52 was
secured largely through the efforts of Lord Denning (soon after he became Master
of the Rolls), aided and abetted initially by Salmon L.J. and Harman L.J .. As
recently as 1956 a former Law Officer had said in the House of Commons that
"one cannot delegate to a judge the decision whether or not Crown privilege
should be given without involving him in matters of public policy which are outside
his ambit and in which it is most undesirable to involve him.,,53 In three influential
decisions the Court of Appeal began to dismantle the defences of Crown privilege.
In the first of these, Merricks v. Nott-Bower, Lord Denning said that he did not
believe that Lord Simon (in the Cammell Laird case) envisaged claims of Crown
privilege based automatically on the phrase "for the proper functioning of the
public service" in order to make documents taboo. 54 In the second, Re Grosvenor
Hotel, London (No.2), Lord Denning truly had the bit between his teeth, reminding
us that "it is the judges who are the guardians of justice in this land: and if they are
to fulfil their trust, they must be able to call on the Minister to put forward his
reasons so as to see if they outweigh the interests of justice." 55 In the course of his
judgment he criticised the Cammell Laird decision and drew inspiration from
45. See R. v. Minisler of Agricullure and Fisheries, ex p. Graham; R. \'. AgricuiJural Laml Tribunal (Smah
Westem Province), ex p. Bellne)' 119551 2 QB. 140, 167.
46. See, e.g., R. v. Brighlon Gaming Licellsillg Commillee, ex p. Coledale LId. 119781 3 All E.R. 897, 899;
Sheffield Cily Council v. Graingers Wines LId. [1978] 2 All E.R. 70, 72; LIn'elock \'. Minisler of Transporl,
Tillles L.R. for 11 June 1980 (The Times, 12 June 1980, at p. 9).
47. See Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom Under the Law (Hamlyn Lectures 1949), at p. 126; Lord Denning,
"The Way of an Iconoclast", (1959) 5 ].s.P. T.L. 77, at p. 88 f[
48. R. v. Crown Courl al Knighlsbridge, ex p. IlIIemalional Sporlillg Club (Londoll) LId. 119811 3 All E.R.
417, 423, per Griffiths L.J.
49. See, e.g., R. v. Horsham J.J., ex p. Farquharson [1982] 2 All E.R. 269, 282.
SO. See, e.g., R. v. SecrelalJ' of Slale fur Ihe EII1'irrmlllel1l,ex p. Salililio 119811 2 :\11 E.R. 897, 919 and
Payne v: Lord Harris ofGreel1wich [19811 2 All E.R. 842, 845.
5 I. For recent accounts of the law, see P. P. Craig, Admillislraliu Law (1983), Ch. 18; John Bell, Polily
Argulllel1ts ill Judicial Decisiolls (1983), Ch. 4.
52. [1942) A.C. 624.
53. HC, Vol. 558, cc. 962-963, 26 October 1956 (Sir Lynn Cngoed-Thomas QC.).
54. [1964] 1 All E.R. 7]7, 722.
55. [19641 3 All E.R. 354, 362.
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developments elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Later on, in the third case
(Wednesbury Corporation v. Minister of Housing and Local Guvernment), he spoke of
the "overwhelming importance" attached by Government departments "to
ensuring secrecy for their own documents", and he deplored a situation where the
courts are (in the words of Master Jacob) to "be led through a kind of ritual dance,
decorously receiving the Minister's certificate, and bowing to its authority.,,56
What Lord Denning was urging at that stage was a requirement that the
Minister should justifY his claims of privilege, a power on the part of the courts to
inspect the documents privately, and a power ultimately to order disclosure. He
felt that a Minister's claim would rarely be overruled, especially where the
objection was related to the actual contents of a document. Even so the views of
the Master of the Rolls and his colleagues had not been tested in the House of
Lords; and, when Lord Denning sat in another Crown privilege case, with two
different colleagues, he found himself in a minority. The new case was Conway v.
Rimmer.57 Lord Denning took his stand on the earlier "trilogy of cases" holding
"that the court has a residual power in a proper case to override the objection of a
minister." 58 The majority of judges, however, felt bound by authority to disagree
with Athos M.R., Porthos and Aramis L.JJ.;59 and it remained for Salmon L.J. (in
his capacity as either Porthos or Aramis) to suggest extra-judicially that the
majority view "may be considered a triumph for sound orthodox principle over
heresy - or it may be condemned as retrograde, reactionary, and wrong." 60 In the
event the House of Lords, freed from the shackles of binding precedent,
reinstated the views of the Three Musketeers,61 thus establishing "the vital
principle ... that the last word lies not with a Minister but with the courts, and that
is the place for it." 62
The battle was not over yet. In Conway v. Rimmer the House of Lords had
accepted Lord Denning's view that the courts had a residual authority to question
claims of Crown privilege. Not until Bunnah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank of England63 were
the new principles to be considered by appellate courts in respect of policy
documents of the central government, and once again Lord Denning instinctively
anticipated (in a dissenting judgment) the approach to be adopted by a majority of
the House of Lords.64 There followed the decision of McNeill J. in Williams v.
56. [196511 All E.R. 186, 190.
57. [1967] 2 All E.R. 1260.
58. Ibid., at 1262.
59. Ibid., at 1273 (Russell L.J.).
60. The Times, 4 July 1967, at p. 10, reporting Salmon L.J.'s speech to Justice on "The Bench as the last
bulwark of individual liberty." In the course of his address Salmon L.J. said: "For my part I do not
mind being compared with the Three ~\'lusketeers. They certainly had independence and courage, if
not morc besides."
61. COl/wa)' v. Rimmer [19681 A.C. 910. For the subsequent trial of the action, which was lost by the
plaintiff, s'ee The Times, 17 December 1969, at p. 4.
62. The Times (a leading article), 29 February 1968, at p. II.
63. [19791 3 All E.R. 700, affirming the Court of Appeal at [19791 2 All E.R. 461.
64. See Case-]\;ote at [1980J C.L.J., pp. 1-5.
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Home Office65 and then the apparent backtracking in Canada v. Secretary ofStateJOr
Trade (No.2). 66 Despite his indignation at the use of documents disclosed in the
Williams litigation, however, Lord Denning took full advantage in Air Canada to
explain the evolution of Crown privilege (or public interest immunity) - even
acknowledging the House of Lords as a "relief force" which came to rescue the
Three Musketeers;67 and he re-emphasised that, in considering a Minister's
certificate claiming "Crown privilege", the scales are tilted in favour of the
Minister.68
This brings us back to the idea of balance. At the start of his campaign he
recognised the special authority which must be attached to a Minister's claims
based on the public interest. In this he was presumably recognising both the
political accountability of Ministers through the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility and the problems of justiciability which would face the courts in
adjudicating on some types of claim. At no stage is there any suggestion that Lord
Denning had abandoned a personal preference for disclosure. It might be recalled
that, in the early stages of the litigation over the Crossman diaries,69 counsel for
the Attorney-General used the analogy of Crown privilege to justifY in part his
application for an interim injunction. The interim injunction was granted at first
instance,70 but it was immediately lifted on appeal to a Court of Appeal presided
over by Lord Denning.7] In a leading article which ended with the words, "Thank
God for Lord Denning", The Times commented that the "first purpose of a free
press, its chief virtue, is that people should be informed of the government of their
country. Democracy depends upon it." 72
When Lord Denning, in the Dimbleby Lecture in 1980,73 called for judicial
review of Parliamentary legislation, his arguments were gently thrust aside by some
commentators.74 At one point in his Lecture he mentioned that the judges in this
country are, just as judges are in the United States, the guardians of our
constitution. Those who would reject his claim, especially on the ground that
judges should not be involved in political matters,75 would do well to recall that
judges are often uniquely equipped to identify areas of vulnerability in the
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constitution. European judges are already able to do so by virtue of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the implications of the Convention have
recently been spelt out by Anthony Lester Qe..76 English judges, encouraged
more and more by the Convention and its application, are nowadays less inhibited
in registering protests even when they cannot act.77 Lord Denning was astute at
combining protest and action; and to the end of his career - over the use of juries
at controversial coroners' inquests,78 over the practice of jury-vetting,79 and over
much else - he reacted, as if (in Thayer's words) through "a marvellous outcome
of instinct", with assurance and authority.
Lord Denning's views have not always prevailed (even in the long term), and he
himself has urged that he should be judged "warts and all". He added (on the
occasion of his retirement): "There are lots of roughnesses, warts and pimples; I
know them perfectly well, and so does the House of Lords." 80He has often been
accused of going beyond his proper judicial role in the utilisation of his own moral,
political and religious views.8) Yet Lord Denning has taken the lead, perhaps as a
late endorsement of Sir Edward Coke's dictum in Dr Bonham's Case,82 in tapping
the resources of the common law in aid of contemporary needs. It is not without
significance in this regard that Cooke J. of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand,
has recently suggested judicially that it would not be within the lawful powers of
Parliament (in New Zealand) to authorise torture in questioning by officials.
"Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not
override them", said Cooke J.83 Judges might, after all, be the guardians of the
constitution.
The emphasis on open government has been adopted in this paper in order to
illustrate the comprehensive nature of Lord Denning's approach to constitutional
issues. In essence he subscribed to the common lawyer's belief in the value of
publicity. Support for public justice spills over into support for open government.
Lord Denning gave an impetus to the movement for open government on a
practical casc-by-case basis. In this, as in so many areas of the law, his influence
will be missed.
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